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Abstract
What holds together the social order? This question recurs even in post-traditional 
conceptions of the social bond and, explicitly or implicitly, leads to the relationship be-
tween power and pre-political sources of the legitimacy. Secularization is not liberation 
from the religious. The fact that politics, with modernity, occupy the space of religion 
charges politics itself of a supplementary symbolic function. The economic theology 
is not a paradigm change: neither the obliteration of political theology and its replace-
ment with a different model. The economic theology is a disguised political theology.
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Resumen
¿Qué es lo que mantiene el orden social? Esta pregunta está presente también en 
las concepciones postradicionales del vínculo social y, explícita o implícitamente, lle-
va a la relación entre poder y fuentes prepolíticas de la legitimidad. La secularización 
no significa liberarse de lo religioso. El hecho de que la política, con la modernidad, 
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sustituya a la religión carga a la política misma de una función simbólica suplemen-
taria. La teología económica no es un cambio de paradigma, no es la eliminación de 
la teología política y su sustitución con un modelo diverso. La teología económica es 
una teología política disfrazada.
Palabras clave
Teología política, teología económica, secularización, modernidad, neoliberalismo
I will propose here a few considerations that are included in a larger study about the 
persistent link between the power and the sacred in modern and contemporary political 
thought. What holds together the social order? This question returns even in post-tra-
ditional conceptions of the social obligation and, explicitly or implicitly, leads to power 
and pre-political sources relationship, which are, for different reasons, covered with a 
sacred aura of legitimacy (that is the belief in the dutifulness of obedience). It is not 
surprising, considering that for most of human history that binding function is ensured 
by the religion. The same political power, in traditional societies, was the guarantor of 
order to the extent it could legitimize itself with respect to the sacred, from which it got 
its auctoritas. Verticality and obedience, community integration, collective beliefs and 
expectations, are semantic fields that convey the surplus of political affiliation, its differ-
ence from any other particular association: these notions and practices have something in 
common with the religious experience. From one point of view, while differing –politics 
has to do with power and conflicts, that is, with the secular order, with religion and with 
salvation– politics and religion can overlap and occupy –even though with different 
languages– the same region. In the name of salvation, power and conflicts may also be 
perceived as religious affairs: hence the constant struggle for hegemony or at least for 
the preservation of a public sphere of influence, as testified by the long history of the 
Holy Roman Church. At some point, however, with modernity, thanks to a number of 
steps that we usually call “secularization”, the political and legal mediation replaces re-
ligion as a cohesive secular power. Such a replacement burdens the politics of symbolic 
functions that used to belong only to religion. Nevertheless, the cohesive and mobilizing 
forces of religious faiths resurface into the public sphere, especially if the political power 
is unable to manage that symbolic function. The world we live in takes it upon itself to 
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show it every day: the end of political religions did not produce a global neutralized 
space, but the resurgence of devotional identities, not rarely politically aggressive. Clear-
ly, in the modern secularization of power and law, something more complex than liberal 
neutrality was involved.
I am convinced that the idea of modern secular society emergence would be a lib-
eration from religion, is misleading. The modern secularization was also, somehow, a 
form of political theology (although “secularized”)1. The same process of de-theolo-
gizing law was achieved replicating residues of the sacred in a secular form, and re-
producing them artificially (the monarchical sovereignty represented as a symbol that 
unify the multitude of people in Hobbes, the myth of the constituent power, the general 
will of Rousseau, the Gramscian hegemony, to the populism theory of Ernesto Laclau). 
The symbolic dimension of the social pact, which allows the maintenance, has itself 
a “mythic-sacral” core. This inevitably leads condition, politics, law and economics 
spheres. If the reference center of social obligation shifts from politics to depoliticized 
law, or to the economy as an expression of a supposed rational “human nature”, what 
does really determine the landslides in the legitimacy of the order? In my view, these 
tectonic movements, which invest the symbolic level, but also concern the balance of 
power between capitalism and democracy, are some of the causes that explain the cur-
rent re-emergence of religion as an important element of public discourse. Obviously 
this is done by many different points of view: from the last Habermas, reflecting the 
pre-political resources of the democratic constitutional State and of those mythic-sacral 
rituals of discursive rationality,2 to the conservative critique of modern societies as ni-
hilistic, and underscore obsessive Islamist threat in the key of “clash of civilizations”, to 
recent theories of economic theology. 
Many knowledgeable propose the theory that today; the so-called “West” has to face 
an existential challenge to its “values” (as it is shown by the Islamist offensive and the al-
leged weakness in facing it). Hence, we have an unexpected “problem”. Which puts into 
the foreground again the relationship between politics and religion. Now, if it is true 
that Western countries have a problem, it seems to me that such problem is related, first 
1. On the topic, there is an extensive bibliography. I will just remind: C. Schmitt, Political Theology, edited by G. Schwab, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2005; C. Schmitt, Political Theology II, translated by M. Hoelzl and G. Warded, Polity 
Press, Cambridge, 2008; E. Peterson, “Monotheism as a political Problem”, in M. J. Hollerich, (ed.), Theological Tractates, 
Stanford University Press, Redwood City (CA), 2011; K. Löwith, Meaning in History, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1949; H. Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, translated by R. M. Wallace, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA), 1983; 
E. W. Böckenförde, “Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisation”, in E. W. Böckenförde, Recht, Staat, Freiheit, 
Suhrkamp, Berlín, 1991. 
2. J. Habermas, Nachmetaphysisches Denken II, Suhrkamp, Berlín, 2012.
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of all, to the countries themselves. That is, with their uncertain political identity, with 
the inability to respond politically to doubts about their “status”: is it really ultimately 
nihilistic, cut off by now from any axiological, ethical and political investment, from any 
democratic and social planning? Anyone who goes against the West (for understandable 
reasons of resistance to its arrogance or in the name of an irrational hatred) can only 
refer to its internal contradiction (as it appears as the “non-place” of the “cult of noth-
ingness,” according to a successful autointerpretation), to which inconsistencies, hypoc-
risy, cynicism, lack of reciprocity, “humanitarian” violence can be connected. The fall of 
communism as political religion has left a void that needed to be covered, so Islam has 
become the reference point of those who were excluded from neoliberal globalization 
(beyond religion as such). 
The question is always about a theological-political background (more or less sec-
ular) of every institution of society (Lefort, Gauchet)3. That is, the role played by refer-
ences to “absolutes” –from the functional point of view, they are revealing because they 
are believed and felt as such– in the validation of society (Schmitt). If, in view of its defi-
cit and in the absence of other sources of hope, a fundamentalist and uncompromising 
religious background melds, to an exponential growth of the sense of injustice and to 
the desperate need to imagine an alternative, the result is an explosive mix of social and 
identity anger. Moreover, we have to think that the political-symbolic establishment 
of the social is not only used to legitimize power, but also to keep open the prospect 
of change and therefore, of hope. The fact that current absolutist capitalism, whose 
background is denied and the hope of a better life is lost, are the reasons why the West 
appears disarmed. 
If we add the fact that there is not any strategic vision, one that would be able to 
identify and defuse the deep wells of hatred, the tension centers for identity (such as 
the Palestinian question, which instead has been removed), and to avoid repeating the 
tremendous mistakes made in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is no reason to be optimistic. 
The deceptive nature of the thesis about the “clash of civilizations” in no way prevents 
that it may become a self-fulfilling prophecy, if is not rationally countered: with the action 
on the actual causes of “fundamentalist terrorism” and the shared responsibility of the 
West. Beyond the bad rhetoric about “Western canon” as a compact identity, a serious 
reflection on the dead end Western countries, have found themselves after 1989 and 
consequences on democracy of post-political ideology are absent or clearly inadequate 
3. See C. Lefort, Essais sur le politique, Editions du Seil, Paris, 1986; M. Gauchet, The Disenchantment of the World, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1997.   
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in the mainstream thinking. The conformism of the elites is one of the most disturbing 
aspects of the crisis at West.
These calls upon the real guest of stone when it comes to dealing with power and 
sacred, religion and politics: capitalism and its “spiritual” dimension. Walter Benjamin 
had sharply caught, in a dense, short fragment, the “religious” character of capitalism4: 
not in the Weberian sense of his dependence on a particular religious ethos (for exam-
ple, the Protestant spirit), but precisely in its deep structure. Capitalism is a religion 
without God and without dogma: pure worship. That is, daily and endless repetition 
of economic practices, as if they were rites (in a capitalist society “weekdays do not 
exist”). Or, to be more precise: God has lost its characteristic (transcendence, or its 
irreducible difference from the world with its automatism), but has not disappeared, 
instead he has been, let us say, metabolized: “Transcendence of God is failed. But he is 
not dead, he has been included in human destiny”. A weak God, if he could not resist 
the mechanism he was incorporated by and whose he had been the architect. Benjamin 
identifies capitalism as the parasite of Christianity (the religion of the incarnation, 
of a God that lowers himself/becomes worldling). As we know, such an immanence 
can be found in at least two different outcomes: on one hand, philosophies of history 
and political religions; on the other, translation of the divine into the daily worship 
of the reproductive mechanism of capital. But Benjamin tends (probably exaggerat-
ing) to overlap them, leaving in the background the other aspect of the “transcen-
dence-immanence” dialectic, the one that deals with the secularization of religious 
issues in ideology and political action. Marx, Freud and Nietzsche (three notorious 
“masters of suspicion”) would be perfectly inscribed inside type of religious capitalist 
thought: socialism, psychoanalysis but also Nietzsche’s active nihilism, would express a 
strengthening of the human aspect that actualizes itself in the repetition of a cult that 
does not expiate, does not redeem, but creates guilt/debt (Schuld). Hence, capitalism 
is a strange religion of despair, that does not allow changes of direction: “the essence 
of this religious movement, capitalism, involves a persistence up to the end, until the 
last and complete guilt/debt attributed to God, until it reaches a condition of cosmic 
despair in which there is still a hope. That is why capitalism is unprecedented: religion 
is no longer the reform of the being, but its complete ruin. Despair becomes a cosmic 
religious condition from which salvation is expected”.
4. W. Benjamin, “Kapitalismus als Religion”, in W. Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, R. Tiedemann und H. Schweppenhäu-
ser, Suhrkamp, Berlín, 1991, Bd. VI, pp. 100-102.
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Contemporary capitalist ideology appears indeed to be an immanentist cult that 
denies the “transcendence” even in its secular version (i.e., needs of human beings not 
resign themselves to the system and to have an alternative), demanding to monopolize 
and to complete its request. There is a paradox reflected here: on one hand, the prin-
ciple by which we must live is still “religious”, and on the other, it hides itself, and gets 
even stronger through its own misleading horizontality with no visible control. The 
true fideistic and intentionally misleading nature (though denied) emerges in the cult 
empowerment, which asserts itself –and here is the change, the difference–  not through 
a sense of belonging to a “beloved” community but investing on the sense of an alleged 
“autonomy” of subjectivities assimilated by the neoliberal “cult” and thus, sterilized (from 
the “capitalization” of the whole expertise of human capacities to the generalized ex-
tension of the logic of evaluation, and to the economization of all social life). These 
mechanisms of indirect power make impossible to find a greater freedom, instead you 
will find control and passiveness. In our opinion, this is the reason why it is not allowed 
to harbor illusions on the alleged liberating potentialities of cognitive capitalism and on 
the possibility of significant changes from within the governance paradigm.
Regardless Benjamin, the huge gap between (modern) political theology and cap-
italism as a religion is that the “political” issue, taking on the problematic nature of 
human beings (hostility, vulnerability, fear, desire for power as symbolic recognition) 
and expressing transcendence in secular forms, left the anthropological question open 
in history. The post-political immanence of developed capitalism demands to reach a 
permanent end. Of course, as we know, for Nietzsche the replacement of theological 
by “political”, accomplished with modern political theology, would open the way to 
the elimination of the “political” (i.e., the State). But it is highly questionable whether 
it is a destiny, which in that difficult “replacement” has been already fully decided. 
More realistically, it is the accumulation of several historical concrete passages –not 
necessary, but determined by the interaction of forces, and hence subject to change in 
their turn– that can explain the feeling of at least apparent and at the same time, dis-
arming fulfillment of the prophecies by Nietzsche and Benjamin. After all, on the con-
trary, both the Communist heresy (not as a system of control, but as one of strength 
and subjectivity to the organized labour movement), and in many respects the social 
democracies with their constitutions (thanks mainly to the consequences of the pres-
ence of that historical subject) are proof that you can provide, albeit in different forms 
and with various degrees, legitimacy to the “political” even in the post-traditional 
mass societies. This is the demonstration of a “difference”: the possibility of an alter-
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native (of which in fact the new technocratic global elite would like to erase the traces, 
even in its social democratic form).
If we assume that the market is a form of general political rationality, immanent 
to society, escaping from which is illusory, such an assumption can only lead to the 
ideological enhancement of neoliberal domain devices: step towards the affirmation 
of “truth” (i.e., effectiveness) of the “discourse of the capitalist” (Lacan) is very short. 
Above all, it appears inevitable to deny the existence of a policy, which declares a real 
conflict. But if secularization is fulfilled in the form of economics, is it really purely eco-
nomic, or rather can it still express a “theological” matrix, even if is it translated into a 
form of life that reverses the political theology into “anti-politics” theology?
Foucault of course, compares the paradigm of “government”, as widespread man-
agement of the lives and “population”, to the one of sovereignty, which is vertically 
legitimated as representative of “people”5. In doing so, it undoubtedly captures im-
portant aspects of the work of capillary power, focusing its investigation on its “ter-
minal” (in the lower levels and the margins of society). But it seems to us that the 
“governmental” paradigm, more than a paradigm that expresses an autonomous and 
deeper social logic, is instead increasingly interwoven with the “sovereign” paradigm 
(which retains its validity, even with its metamorphosis and relativization), and in this 
key is more useful by a heuristic point of view. “Governmentality” would be a kind 
of long-term “material constitution”, whose roots would be in the “pastoral power”6, 
but later would find its full realization in the modern economic liberalism. Such an 
interpretation, beyond historical and philosophical stunt jumping, involves question-
able consequences: for example, transformations of the modern State, such as those 
related to social rights and the affirmation of democratic sovereignty, are neutralized, 
like surface waves that do not change current the background. Not to mention, in the 
economic field, Keynes’s lesson. In my view, the “government” is not “the” paradigm 
of power in the West, a sort of its “revelation”, that destroys centuries of modern legal 
doctrines (which have had a role in the creation of effectiveness) and philosophical 
theories (such as those of Hobbes or Rousseau, that have shown a good capacity of 
rational articulation of political order). The problem of legitimacy is not overpassed 
or replaced by the governmental performance. After all, “gubernaculum” model (as 
management and composition of the parts) has not historically been a neutral model: 
5. M. Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, A. I. Davidson (ed.), translated by G. Purchell, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2008.
6. M. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, I. Davidson (ed.), translated by G. Purchell, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 
2009. 
Geminello Preterossi          ThE PowER ANd ThE SACREd: ThE IMPoSSIBLE GoodByE?
106
Soft Power          Volumen 3, número 1, enero-junio, 2016
hierarchical, organismic, communitarian, used to ignore the principle of equality and the 
individual rights in the name of special immutable statuses and related duties. Is it not 
deeply ideological to identify the doctrine of sovereignty (relativizing the transition from 
a monarchic to a popular one) merely as a mask of a “real” story (and thus “truer”, of 
course), in a sort of paradoxical reiteration, with other categories, of the Marxian plan 
that opposed the structure to the superstructure? The “governmental” hypothesis is use-
ful to enrich concrete practices of modern and late-modern power, to understand what 
are the resources (in terms of creation of subjects’ behaviour) from which globalization 
gleans (which however is not a definitive anthropological event but a process in motion, 
as all the events of history, and therefore susceptible to political action). But it makes no 
sense to generalize uncritically that paradigm. Archaeology as counter-history is a brilliant 
method that, based on a theoretical hypothesis underlying the power, enabled, in its appli-
cation, irrefutable acquisitions (on insanity, prison, etc.). There is a risk that it could result, 
especially in certain uses of biopolitics, perhaps in spite of intentions, in a tacit philosophy 
of history and in a political philosophic camouflage of neoliberalism.
Recently, in the wake of Foucault and Benjamin, also Giorgio Agamben7 has attempted 
to outline an alternative paradigm to the theological-political one, investigating genea-
logically economic and pastoral function performed by the Christian religion and the 
Church, in order to understand the structure of the power as a “government of men” in 
western countries. Such an approach, despite its seemingly antiquarian character, is a phil-
osophical-political stance tuned on the “Zeitgeist”. Of great interest, but also a source of 
doubt not only on the overall resilience of this interpretation of an historical-conceptual 
point of view, but also on its partiality despite the claim of being exhaustive: is it really 
true that the economic theology “incorporates” the political theology, and when exactly? 
Is it really true that the global economy is the recovery or even the fulfillment of an old, 
unitary and forgotten tradition (from Aristotle’s oikonomia to trinitarian theology)? Is it 
credible that the “glory” has to do with an essential “economic” power, and not also, and 
especially, with the autonomous symbolic efficacy of a charismatic leadership with a clear 
political and military profile (from ancient Rome to the medieval Germanic assemblies to 
the huge gatherings of the twentieth century)? Is the argument according to which public 
opinion and acclamatio are basically the same thing quite forced, as it states that they obey 
the same “communicative” logic (as if there were no distinction between critical discourse 
in a pluralistic society and plebiscitary acclamation), and that both are working as glo-
7. See G. Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, translated by Lorenzo Chiesa and M. Mandarini, Stanford University Press, 
Redwood City (CA), 2011.
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rification of the totally inclusive power of the economy? Isn’t there any risk of improper 
overlapping, in this retrospective game of mirrors, which borders ideological narrative? 
We can ask if the paradigm of economic theology is really able to give an account of a 
“material constitution” of long duration that cuts out or resize legal modernity: a kind of 
surface wave that always, secretly, guards, cares, increases the depth of a bionomics power. 
Is economic theology –pastoral, real or imaginary, of the Church, or the one, very differ-
ent, of capitalism that today demands to govern our lives– able to take up the challenge 
of making order, the challenge that political theology used to win? Namely, protection of 
human vulnerability from violence, certainty of security, artificial and not spontaneous 
allocation of scarce resources to ensure the survival of the associates? Today the impasse 
of democracy, depoliticized by neoliberalism, arises also because of the tendency to bypass 
this issue. Neoliberalism is trying to stabilize itself by normalizing the “state of exception”, 
turning it into a daily practice of government, of administrative nature. But it does pay a big 
price to constitutionalism. And in any case, it fails. A failure that can lead the way to neo- 
authoritarian escape routes. As it is shown by the crisis of Europe, which is pouring out upon 
the European nation states, undermining the democratic sovereignty and social integration.
Hence, my opinion is that economic theology is not a difference in the paradigm, 
the obliteration of political theology and its replacement with a different model. Eco-
nomic theology is a disguised political theology. We must to be extra careful not taking 
too seriously the ideological self-narration of horizontality and the diffused and shared 
power. It is true that new techno-financial power is anonymous, dull and seemingly 
neutral, but in fact the load of verticality, hierarchy and even violence convey, is unusu-
al. Just think about the logic of the exception and asymmetric wars that characterize it. 
In addition, this new power is the object of a cult and asks uncritical adherence. It shuns 
the sacralisation of visible, excess power, looking for joining the immanence of natural 
liberty. But in this way, it does not cancel the trace of power-violence, and it also leads 
to the sacralisation of homo oeconomicus. The fact that this appropriative and com-
petitive paradigm may be covered and “morally” overloaded by the liberal ideology of 
internationalism and moral rights, not only confirms the renewed need of sacred, even 
instrumentally, but that the deficit of democratic sovereignty is offset by a moral surplus 
that also captures law. This trend causes a short-circuit between a chaotic economic 
theology and an uncertain legal humanitarian theology, increasingly detached by public 
law, which rhetorically produces consent but does not create an effective mediation and 
a real stability. It is not by chance if theological-political ghosts have not disappeared at 
all, but they keep on showing themselves, not as a legacy but as a real outbreak. 
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